






THE ECONOMY AS OF LABOR
DAY
As the country made its usual transition from
summer vacations to autumn’s back-to-work sea-
son, the U.S. economy was growing slowly, if at
all. Let’s begin our analysis by asking: What hap-
pened to 2001? What can we say about why the
economy was limping along? This analysis is
highly relevant to our current prospects because
what we will observe in coming quarters will be
a mixture of adjustments flowing from the state
of the economy as of Labor Day and adjustments
from the tragic events of September 11.
This year’s slowdown has been atypical, an
unusual mixture of reasonably strong household
demand and extremely weak business investment
spending. Corporate profits have fallen at almost
a 20 percent rate. Business investment in equip-
ment and software, which had grown at double-
digit rates through the first half of 2000, slowed
during last year’s third quarter and has declined
for the last three quarters. After adjusting for infla-
tion, business demand for information-processing
equipment had grown at a 16 percent annual rate
from the first quarter of 1992 to the end of last
year. This year, that demand fell at an annual rate
of more than 12 percent in the first quarter and
almost 20 percent during the second quarter. The
speed of the slowdown in business investment
demand has left many firms, especially in the
telecommunications and high-tech sectors, with
significant excess inventory. Contributing to the
slowdown may be the fact that the relatively
young age of business capital equipment, due to
O
n September 10, the U.S. economy
was limping along but with the
promise of faster growth before too
long. The next morning, we suffered
grievous and vicious terrorist attacks. It is too
early to speak with any confidence about the
likely short-run economic effects of the attacks.
Tonight, I want to share with you my conviction
that our long-run prospects, though changed in
detail, remain bright and unchanged in funda-
mentals. I also want to speak in quite general
terms about the short run. Our economy is
resilient, both because our people are resilient
and because we rely so greatly on decentralized
markets. These markets will assist us in reallo-
cating our economic resources in ways that will
deal effectively with the new realities we face.
Before proceeding I want to emphasize that
the views I express are mine and do not necessar-
ily reflect official Federal Reserve positions. I
thank my colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis for their comments. Bob Rasche,
Research director, and Dick Anderson, vice presi-
dentintheResearchdivision,wereespecially help-
ful. However, I retain full responsibility for errors.
In assessing our short-run prospects, we need
to understand the special features of the pre-attack
economy and then examine the likely effects flow-
ing from the events of September 11. I will not
attempt to provide any detail on the short-run
outlook, for I do not believe that any economist
can have great confidence in detailed assessments.
What I’m going to do instead is outline the major
considerations as I see them. I hope that this frame-
work will prove useful in thinking about develop-
ments as they occur.the rapid pace of investment, makes it less costly
to defer replacement.
Manufacturing, especially telecommunica-
tions and electronic equipment, has borne the
brunt of the fall—but as of Labor Day there were
some signs of emerging weakness for the entire
nonfarm business sector. During the second
quarter, hours worked fell at a sharp 2.6 percent
annual rate, the largest since the trough of the
last recession during the first quarter of 1991.
Smoothing through quarterly fluctuations, since
the fourth quarter of last year, output in the non-
farm business sector is approximately flat and
total hours worked down only slightly.
Unlike business spending, household spend-
ing has continued to grow moderately this year,
despite being buffeted by changes in income,
wealth and consumer confidence. Although
unemployment has increased, labor markets
through August remained favorable for workers;
employment levels remained relatively high and
real earnings continued to increase. Compensation
per hour in the nonfarm business sector during
the second quarter increased at a 4.8 percent
annual rate after increasing at a 5.1 percent pace
during the first quarter.
Demand for light motor vehicles and housing
has been robust, with record or near record sales
rates in both markets. The inventory of completed
homes remained low. Although longer-term inter-
est rates have fallen little this year, last year’s
large decreases left mortgage rates at perceived
bargain levels. From highs in May 2000, conven-
tional 30-year mortgage rates have decreased by
approximately 1½ percentage points. Existing-
home sales have remained at a 5.2 million unit
annual rate since January 1999. Private housing
starts remain above a 1.6 million pace, with some
builders reporting low inventory and substantial
order backlogs. In addition, despite some fluctu-
ations, light motor vehicle sales have held up well.
Sales in August, at a 16.4 million unit pace, were
comparable to the strong pace of late 1998 and
early 1999, although slower than the rate of 17.5
million units sold during the same month last
year. The modest slowdown in light vehicle sales
did create an inventory buildup last winter, but
the industry responded quickly and effectively
to return inventories to a normal level relative to
sales.
Although real consumer spending remained
reasonably strong through August, it had slowed
from the pace of recent years. During both 1998
and 1999, measured from fourth quarter to fourth
quarter,realconsumerspendingincreasedapproxi-
mately 5 percent. During 2000, spending growth
slowed to a 4.2 percent pace. This year, spending
decelerated to a 3.0 percent rate during the first
quarter and a 2.2 percent pace during the third.
Despite decreases in equity prices that have
reduced the ratio of household wealth to income,
the ratio remains significantly above its pre-1995
level. But, on the other side of their balance sheet,
households also have a great deal of debt; debt-
service payments remain high relative to house-
hold income.
From a somewhat longer perspective, the
recent slowing of aggregate household demand
broadly resembles its behavior during previous
economic slowdowns. During the two years prior
to the business cycle peak in July 1990, real per-
sonal consumption expenditures, on a fourth-
quarter to fourth-quarter basis, increased 4½
percent during 1988 and 2 percent during 1989.
Prior to the December 1969 cyclical peak, real
expenditures increased 6½ percent during 1968
and 3 percent during 1969. Prior to the April 1960
peak, real expenditures increased 4¾ percent
during 1959, and then 2 percent during 1960.
This year’s slowdown in aggregate consumption
expenditures, then, is not out of line with previ-
ous periods of slowing consumption.
When, however, we examine consumer
expenditures in more detail, current experience
is atypical. Because interest rates have remained
relatively low during this slowdown, spending
on durable goods including light vehicles has
slowed considerably less than might be expected
from historical experience. Purchases of durables
increased 5.3 percent during 2000 (fourth quarter
to fourth quarter), slower than its growth rates of
12.7 percent during 1998 and 11.3 percent during
1999. Prior to July 1990, however, the numbers
were much worse: a 0.4 percent decrease during
1989 following a 6.3 percent increase during
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21988. During the recession year of 1990 itself,
durables purchases contracted by 3.5 percent. If
we go back further, a similar pattern is evident
prior to the December 1969 cyclical peak. The
recent experience isn’t nearly as weak.
But, looking forward, some caution was in
order even as of Labor Day. Consumer confidence
hadfallensignificantly,andmanyanalyststhought
falling equity prices might depress spending. It
was not unreasonable to expect that a weaken-
ing labor market might also affect spending in
the months following Labor Day. Firms had
announced the layoff of more than 1 million
workers so far this year. Manufacturing employ-
ment is down from one year ago by 940,000. Non-
farm private payroll employment, although greater
than one year ago, has decreased on average by
106,000 per month since April, a pace typical for
the early stages of an economic slowdown. For
households, the Bureau of Labor Statistics August
survey showed a decrease in employment of 1
million. Net of the 400,000 who ceased looking
for work and hence are no longer classified as
unemployed, the overall unemployment rate
jumped to 4.9 percent.
Although the August labor market report was
dismal, some analysts questioned the estimates,
noting that an unusually large number of teenagers
became unemployed. That fact raises concern
regarding the accuracy of seasonal-adjustment
factors as schools opened in August. Aggregate
hours for nonfarm private payroll employees
shrank only 0.4 percent during August, low rela-
tive to prior slowdowns; for manufacturing, hours
decreased 1.3 percent. New claims for unemploy-
ment insurance have been relatively high—near
or above 400,000 per week since April—but
appeared to have stabilized.
In addition to a shift in business optimism,
causes for the slowdown this year likely include
higher energy prices, lower equity prices, tighter
credit standards (both at banks and in private
placements), and slower economic activity over-
seas. Sorting out the interactions among these
factors will keep economists well employed for
several years.
One factor—“the dog that didn’t bark”—is
the absence of inflation. Past cyclical downturns
have been characterized, almost as a signature,
by an acceleration of inflation prior to a cyclical
peak either due to a supply shock (such as sharply
higher energy prices) or overly expansive mone-
tary policy that contributed to aggregate demand
growing more rapidly than supply. In 2001, I
believe an increase in the rate of inflation was
forestalled by the preemptive monetary policy
tightening that began in mid-1999.
In summary, the economy as of Labor Day was
characterized by a weak manufacturing sector,
led by a tech downturn of major proportions.
However, consumption spending and housing
were holding up very well. Notable were contin-
uing good sales of consumer durables, especially
autosandlighttrucks,andarobusthousingmarket.
Households, and the firms that lend to them,
apparently had a favorable outlook for the future,
for otherwise they would not have been assuming
these large financial commitments.
ADJUSTMENTS TO COME
The decline in spending on high-tech equip-
ment and software will end at some point, and
growth will resume. I do not know when the
recovery will begin; nor do I know how vigorous
the revival will be. Certainly the outlook may
have changed somewhat from the view as of Labor
Day, which was a reasonable expectation of a
revival in the fourth quarter of this year.
We should note, however, that the current
capital-adjustment process is not a new phenom-
enon in economics. Economists have studied
these matters in considerable detail. One of the
oldest ideas in macroeconomics is that business
investment spending depends on expectations of
future sales and profits. In his General Theory,
for example, John Maynard Keynes noted that it
was impossible to assess the rate of return on an
investment project until one knew expectations
of future economic conditions. Further, in com-
ments that foreshadowed the dot-com IPO phe-
nomenon of the 1990s, Keynes observed that
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to occur if the shares in a new firm can be sold
in an equity market for more than the cost of the
investment. In this manner, expectations can be
self-fulfilling and reinforcing. A shift in sentiment
to malaise can bring a very abrupt halt to the busi-
ness investment boom.
It is unlikely that excess investment optimism,
followed by the shift in sentiment, accounts for
all of the 2001 economic slowdown in the United
States. But, it seems clear that the tech reversal
has played a major role. What I think is notable
is not that overall growth slowed but instead that
a recession had apparently been avoided as of
Labor Day.
Why had the tech tumble not spilled over to
the rest of the economy to a significant degree?
Three factors were at work. First, without question,
monetary policy easing starting in January played
an important role. Second, interest rates fell last
year, reflecting a reduction in credit demands to
finance tech expansion and anticipations of future
monetary policy easing. These rate declines were
important in sustaining housing activity and
household demand for consumer durable goods
this year. Third, and perhaps most important of
all, widespread optimism about the longer-run
course of the economy sustained spending on a
wide range of goods. People saw, I believe cor-
rectly, that the tech troubles were likely to be
temporary. By “temporary” I mean that the dura-
tion of the problem was measured in quarters
rather than years.
It is very important that we maintain a long-
run perspective. Years from now, it will be of
interest to economists, but few others, just how
many quarters it took to move along the adjust-
ment curve. The basic fact is that the U.S. econ-
omy allocates resources across all the different
types and varieties of goods and services through
highly competitive markets. These markets are
very efficient in adjusting to changing demand
and supply conditions.
Let me now apply this same analysis to the
situation we face in the wake of September 11.
Clearly, the airline and hotel industries, and
related services, have been greatly affected. No
one knows how long these effects will persist.
What we do know is that markets will do a good
job in reallocating resources. I am not saying that
the affected industries will not suffer great pain;
I am saying that the economy as a whole need
not, and I believe will not, suffer great pain.
Resources—both capital and labor—will flow
from some industries to other ones and the aggre-
gate economy will grow.
THE LONG-RUN OUTLOOK
It is my conviction that the U.S. economy
contains very powerful forces promoting growth
and full employment. Our society rewards entre-
preneurs and innovators. We are much better off
living in a society where people may be some-
times excessively exuberant—as some may have
been in the late 1990s—than one in which few
are prepared and able to take risks. Our strengths
include a resilient people, efficient markets, and
low inflation. The Federal Reserve has made clear
for many years its commitment to maintaining
low inflation, and that commitment is widely
believed in the financial markets. Let me talk
briefly about each of these long-run strengths.
Our culture and institutions reward entre-
preneurial activity. They are intact, completely
undiminished by the tragedy of September 11.
People are motivated by the intellectual and finan-
cial rewards of building companies and serving
markets. They will be looking for opportunities
to move the U.S. economy forward. Government
policies and the structure of our labor and capital
markets enable entrepreneurs to be successful.
Those conditions are in place, undepreciated.
A market system works most effectively when
price signals are not confused by inflationary
expectations. There is no evidence that behavior
since September 11 has been motivated by fear
of inflation. We saw a few lines at gas stations
Tuesday of last week, based on unfounded fears
of a physical shortage rather than a fear of sharply
higher prices. I emphasize this point because in
previous crises—the outbreak of the Korean War
is a clear example—fear of rising prices consider-
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stability almost for granted is a great strength of
our current condition. Equally important, a market
economy requires that households and firms be
able to make and receive payments reliably. The
Fed provided a huge amount of liquidity through
various channels and made cash readily available
so banks could keep their ATMs stocked. In these
and other ways, the Federal Reserve labored long,
hard, and effectively since September 11 to keep
the payments system working. We succeeded.
I’ve emphasized that near-term adjustments
are already occurring in response to the tech
tumble and now also, even more importantly, in
response to the events of September 11. These
adjustments need not have a major persisting
aggregate economic impact. Let me use a sailing
analogy, drawn from my many years of sailing
small boats. I know the racing mark I have to go
around, but sometimes get pushed off course by
an adverse wind shift or squall. Those short-run
events do not prevent me from reaching my objec-
tive, although they may make my passage slower.
The natural state of the U.S. economy is growth
and full employment. We’ll get there.
I do not want to minimize the size of the cur-
rent shock; I do want to caution against maximiz-
ing it. The economy has pushed ahead following
previous shocks. In my personal experience, I
think back to the Korean War, the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the Kennedy assassination, and other
shocks. I will not try to rank them against the
current situation. But I am confident, given our
prior experience, given our economy’s character-
istics and the characteristics of our people, the
economy will be fine. We will get back on course
before too long.
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